

This article was downloaded by: [Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile]  
On: 04 March 2015, At: 05:11  
Publisher: Routledge  
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954  
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,  
UK



[Click for updates](#)

## Democratization

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20>

### The return of censitary suffrage? The effects of automatic voter registration and voluntary voting in Chile

Gonzalo Contreras<sup>a</sup>, Alfredo Joignant<sup>b</sup> & Mauricio Morales<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Observatorio Político Electoral, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile

<sup>b</sup> Political Science, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile

Published online: 04 Mar 2015.

**To cite this article:** Gonzalo Contreras, Alfredo Joignant & Mauricio Morales (2015): The return of censitary suffrage? The effects of automatic voter registration and voluntary voting in Chile, *Democratization*, DOI: [10.1080/13510347.2014.986720](https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.986720)

**To link to this article:** <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.986720>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

## The return of censitary suffrage? The effects of automatic voter registration and voluntary voting in Chile

Gonzalo Contreras<sup>a</sup>, Alfredo Joignant<sup>b\*</sup> and Mauricio Morales<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>*Observatorio Político Electoral, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile;* <sup>b</sup>*Political Science, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile*

(Received 4 November 2014; accepted 9 November 2014)

How does a change from a compulsory voting system to a voluntary one affect election turnout? It is often argued that an electoral regime under which voting is voluntary reproduces class bias or, in other words, that the rich vote more than the poor. This bias is corrected either by the introduction of compulsory voting or the existence of strong left-wing parties and trade unions able to mobilize poorer segments of the population. In this article, we put forward an alternative argument. We assert that when voting is voluntary, class bias can disappear if an election is very competitive since this affects both turnout and its socio-economic composition. To evaluate this argument, we examine the case of Chile's 2012 municipal election when voting was voluntary for the first time, instead of compulsory.

**Keywords:** election turnout; class bias; voluntary voting

### 1. Introduction

How does a change of electoral regime affect turnout? How true is it that voluntary voting intensifies class bias? How does an election's competitiveness affect turnout? This article analyses the effect of voluntary voting on turnout in the local elections which took place in Chile in 2012. The key question is whether this new electoral regime reproduced the class bias that existed prior to the reform<sup>1</sup> or, in other words, whether turnout was higher in rich segments of the population than in poor ones. We argue that, in order to obtain a more accurate view of the relationship between poverty and turnout, it is necessary to include the election's competitiveness as a contingent variable. We note that this variable has different effects depending on a municipality's poverty rate. Turnout is similar in rich and poor municipalities when the race is close. However, when a candidate wins by a large majority, it is significantly higher in rich than in poor municipalities. In other words, rich and poor municipalities react differently to electoral

---

\*Corresponding author. Email: [alfredo.joignant@mail.udp.cl](mailto:alfredo.joignant@mail.udp.cl)

competition. We argue that this occurs because, in rich municipalities, there is a predominance of voters with a higher educational level and greater civic awareness.

This article is divided into five sections. In the first, we present the theoretical discussion followed, in the second, our central argument. In the third section, we describe the case of Chile and, in the fourth, explain the methodology and data used before, finally, discussing the implications and presenting the conclusions.

## 2. Theory discussion: voluntary voting and class bias

Election turnout is determined by institutional, political, socio-economic and, even, climatic factors.<sup>2</sup> One of the most important institutional factors is the electoral regime or, in other words, whether voting is compulsory or voluntary.<sup>3</sup> Compulsory voting has three important advantages. First, countries using this system have higher turnouts than those where voting is voluntary.<sup>4</sup> Second, compulsory voting is conducive to the stability of the party system since, as voters are obliged to vote, they are more likely to support or identify with one of the parties competing in the election. In the case of Australia, for example, Mackerras and McAllister assert that, although resulting in a high percentage of invalid (spoiled and blank) votes, compulsory voting nonetheless contributes to the stability of the party system.<sup>5</sup> Third, it is often argued that compulsory voting reduces political inequality.<sup>6</sup> Under this electoral system the obligation of both rich and poor to vote dilutes the possible class bias, whereas when voting is voluntary, this is more visible because the rich vote in greater numbers than the poor.<sup>7</sup> The problem then is that if turnout is unequal, so too is representation. If the richest vote, it is more difficult to consolidate state redistributive and solidarity policies.<sup>8</sup>

Other studies have shown that socio-economic level also affects turnout when it interacts with other variables. In the case of Finland, Martikainen, Martikainen, and Wass conclude that the effect of income level on turnout is weaker among young people and that education has a more significant effect in this age group.<sup>9</sup> In the case of Chile, Corvalán and Cox showed that there is an unusual level of class bias.<sup>10</sup> Before voting became voluntary, young people registered to vote in significantly smaller numbers than other age groups and, even more seriously, poor young people registered much less than their rich peers.

Finally, another group of authors has examined the relationship between electoral competition and poverty in order to explain turnout. This work includes, for example, Indridason on the French elections of 1997 and 2002 and that of Simonovits on Hungary's general elections.<sup>11</sup> Simonovits shows that, when the difference between two candidates widens in the first round, turnout drops significantly in the second round.<sup>12</sup> There are, however, not many studies examining the interaction between competition and variables of other types, although the work of Johnston et al. stands out for its analysis of the interaction between competition and age groups and its effect on turnout.<sup>13</sup> In our case, following the literature on

competition and class bias, we examine the interaction between competition and poverty.

Chile falls partly within this theory in that it has a voluntary voting system and, particularly, because of the weakness of its trade unions.<sup>14</sup> It does not, therefore, have any of the attributes that would, apparently, prevent or reduce class bias and, rather, has all the characteristics that suggest its large-scale reproduction. However, the first election with voluntary voting which took place in Chile in 2012 shows that class bias can disappear to the extent that competition between the candidates increases. Although competition is a contingent and not structural (institutional) variable, it nonetheless permits a more accurate analysis of the presence and magnitude of class bias.

### 3. Our argument

Our argument is that, while class bias has survived in Chile, it has done so only partially. In a correlation of levels of wealth with turnout, the coefficient is close to zero. However, in a statistical model that includes other variables, the result changes very significantly. This is particularly clear when the degree of competition between the candidates is included. It does not, however, suffice to include this as an additional variable. In our view, a term for interaction between the election's competitiveness and wealth should be constructed. In this way, it will be possible to determine the conditions under which class bias occurs. We conclude that class bias disappears in competitive elections and emerges in less competitive elections. In other words, citizens vote, independently of their socio-economic condition, when there is uncertainty but, when an election has a predictable result, the rich vote in greater numbers than the poor. Voluntary voting cannot, therefore, be related directly to class bias. After controlling for the degree of competition between candidates, this bias may appear, maintain its level, or simply disappear.

Naturally, the degree of competition is endogenous to turnout. An election's competitiveness (the difference between the winner and the runner-up) is revealed once people have voted and it would, therefore, be difficult for it to explain turnout. We argue, however, that the fact there is greater competition and, in addition, higher turnout implies that citizens perceived that the election would be close and decided to vote. Ideally, there would be opinion polls indicating citizens' perception of the election's competitiveness but we do not have this information for Chile's 345 municipalities. With these methodological caveats, we, therefore, calculate the degree of competition as the difference between the winner and the runner-up.

We argue that electoral competition reduces class bias, especially in more urbanized poor segments of the population. In rich urban municipalities, turnout is not affected by changes in the level of competition but, in poor urban municipalities, it has a significant effect, with a higher level of competition implying a larger turnout. What is the reason for this difference between rich and poor urban municipalities? Why are only the latter responsive to electoral competition? Given the class bias

discussed above, rich people in Chile vote more than poor people, regardless of the type of election and the candidates. They have a more deeply rooted civic culture that is not found in poor segments. Interest in politics and identification with parties is moreover stronger in rich segments than in poor ones.<sup>15</sup> This was apparent even before the introduction of voluntary voting, particularly among young people.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, although it is true that rich municipalities had a base turnout that was systematically higher than in poor municipalities, the level of competition was not related to changes in this turnout. This appears contradictory since voters who are better educated and better informed should respond more readily to electoral competition. However, especially in the case of Chile, turnout among these voters tends to be more stable precisely because of their level of information and interest in politics.

Poor municipalities, on the other hand, were very sensitive to competition. Clientelism is probably more common in these municipalities and this affects turnout, particularly under a voluntary voting system. Parties and candidates have to accomplish two tasks: to convince voters they are the right option and to get them to go to the polls. It is, therefore, not surprising that a competitive election leads to more mobilization and a higher turnout and that the opposite occurs in less competitive elections where voters feel that their vote would not count. As there is less interest in politics and less identification with parties, a non-competitive election without mobilization will imply a low turnout. Although Chile is classified as having one of Latin America's highest indices of programmatic party structuration of electoral preferences,<sup>17</sup> clientelist practices are not new and are the norm rather than the exception.<sup>18</sup>

#### 4. The case of Chile

The introduction of voluntary voting produced a drop in turnout and also contributed to the survival of class bias. We use the word survival because this bias already existed under the previous electoral system.<sup>19</sup> Chile had a system in which voter registration was voluntary and voting was compulsory, albeit without effective sanctions for failure to do so. Although the comparative literature considered Chile a case of "compulsory voting",<sup>20</sup> the system was, in practice, "semi-voluntary". Only those on the electoral register were obliged to vote and, in a strict sense, Chile's change of electoral system was, therefore, not entirely comparable to those seen in Holland at the beginning of the 1970s or Venezuela in the 1990s. Nonetheless, this institutional modification changed the structure of incentives for the political parties. The number of potential voters increased significantly, accompanied by uncertainty as to how many people would turn out to vote on election day.

In previous elections turnout reached around 60% of the voting age population but in the municipal election of October 2012 was scarcely more than 40%.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, voluntary voting did not eliminate the class bias that had existed prior to the reform. This was particularly evident in those municipalities where the election was not competitive. In these municipalities, the rich voted in

greater numbers than the poor, transforming the election into a “censitary” act. In more competitive municipalities, on the other hand, class bias practically disappeared. This suggests a need to rethink the theoretically linear relation between income and turnout and to include another type of theoretical and methodological specifications. As asserted above, turnout reflects not only institutional, political, and economic variables separately but also the interaction between them.

Three elements should be taken into account when analysing turnout in the 2012 municipal elections. First, the previous system (voluntary registration and compulsory voting) also produced a class bias that was discernible at different stages: at the time of registering (not all Chileans registered equally),<sup>22</sup> in the casting of spoiled or blank votes;<sup>23</sup> and on election day (from 1988 onwards, compulsory voting gradually lost its coercive character, becoming compulsory voting without sanction, a situation that was recognized and modified by the reform establishing automatic registration and voluntary voting). Second, Chile’s experience in the recent municipal election in 2012 indicates that a municipality’s socio-economic level interacts with the degree of competition and dispute among the candidates for mayor. In other words, turnout varies not only with socio-economic level but also with the level of uncertainty that an election produces. Through this analysis, we seek to contribute to the most up-to-date theoretical discussion about the relationship between competition and turnout.<sup>24</sup>

After the introduction of voluntary voting, there was extensive debate about its effects, recalling that the reform reflected the preferences of a vast majority of Chileans but was the result of an agreement reached by members of the Lower House who were not necessarily convinced of the reform’s virtues.<sup>25</sup> Based on a simple correlation between a municipality’s poverty rate and turnout, some argued that the latter was higher in poor than in rich municipalities, refuting the thesis that the poor vote less than the rich. The problem with this simple correlation is that it omits variables that are extraordinarily important for understanding variations in turnout, including particularly the size of a municipality’s population<sup>26</sup> (there are municipalities with 500 voters and others with over 300,000) and the nature of the electoral competition between candidates for mayor. Conversely, other authors sought to control for these variables, concluding that class bias increased with the introduction of voluntary voting.<sup>27</sup>

#### **4.1. *Election turnout and crisis of representation in Chile***

Within Latin America, Chile stands out for its high levels of election turnout.<sup>28</sup> At the start of the new democracy (1990), it was very high.<sup>29</sup> In a climate of political uncertainty, given the possibility of a return to authoritarianism, Chileans turned out massively to vote in the plebiscite of 1988 and the first free presidential and legislative elections which took place in 1989. Under a system of voluntary voter registration and compulsory voting (which remained in force until 2012), some 7.5 million people out of a total of 8.5 million potential voters (the voting

age population), or almost 89%, registered in 1988 and 94.7% of these registered voters went on to participate in the plebiscite, a turnout never since repeated.

In the mid-1990s, growth of the electoral register (or, in other words, the contingent of people who decided to register to vote and were, thereafter, obliged to do so) began to slow sharply. This was particularly apparent from 1993, which marked the start of a sustained widening of the gap between the voting age population and registered voters (Figure 1). While the former increased significantly (reaching over 12 million persons in 2009), the latter held steady at around eight million. Turnout never dropped below 85% of registered voters, reflecting the fact that voting was compulsory, albeit without effective economic sanctions for failing to do so. This positioned Chile as having among the highest turnouts in Latin America. However, closer analysis of the data raises clear questions about this claim. The electoral register did not grow at the same rate as the voting age population and by 2009 the percentage of the latter that was registered had dropped to 68%, down from almost 89% in 1988. For the 2009 elections, the voting age population reached an estimated 12.2 million but there were only around 8.3 million registered voters. The same is also true for validly cast votes as a percentage of the voting age population which has also shown a clear decline since 1989.

As a result, while turnout dropped progressively, there was an even clearer decline in interest in registering to vote. For the 2009 presidential election, almost four million people who would have been eligible to vote did not register to do so. This meant that elected presidents had an ever lower level of electoral support and were, therefore, very minority mandates with respect to the voting age population, rendering them potentially vulnerable to erosion of their legitimacy. In the 1989 presidential election, the percentage of valid votes (that is, votes for one of the contenders) as a proportion of the voting age population reached 82.12%, but by 2009 had dropped to around 57.13%. In other words, the president was elected with the support of only around 29% of citizens aged 18 or over.




Figure 1. Voting age population and votes cast in Chilean elections, 1989–2012.

Source: Own calculations using data from [www.servel.cl](http://www.servel.cl) and [www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl).

Finally, under the regime of voluntary voter registration and compulsory voting, the age distribution of the electoral register was totally unbalanced. As shown in Figure 2, young people accounted for an ever smaller fraction of the register<sup>30</sup> and by 2009 this had dropped to less than 9%, down from around one-third in 1988. This lack of interest in registering on the part of young people was accompanied by class bias since their rate of registration was significantly higher in rich municipalities than in poor ones.<sup>31</sup>

It was in this context that discussion about reform of the electoral system intensified,<sup>32</sup> an issue that is a subject of controversy in the more normative literature on voting.<sup>33</sup> After prolonged debate, automatic registration and voluntary voting came into force and was used for the first time in the 2012 municipal election.<sup>34</sup> As indicated above, turnout in that election plummeted by more than 15 percentage points with respect to the previous municipal election in 2008 when almost seven million people voted as compared to some 5.5 million in 2012 (Figure 3). In other words, almost 1.5 million voters who had turned out in 2008 apparently stayed away four years later.<sup>35</sup>

These results were interpreted in three different ways that are not necessarily mutually contradictory. First, high abstention was interpreted as a strong sign of rejection of the traditional political class and, second, as indicating that people saw their vote as having little power and, therefore, had little incentive to turn out. Similar perceptions also existed under the previous electoral system but with the difference that an important part of the voting age population was then obliged to vote. Third, it was interpreted simply as showing that voters see politics as an activity that is remote from and has little impact on their lives. Citizens do not vote because they do not need politics or, rather, because they perceive it as a dispensable activity.




Figure 2. Electoral register by age, 1988–2009.  
 Source: Own calculations using data from [www.servel.cl](http://www.servel.cl).




Figure 3. Percentage of votes cast and valid votes over voting age population.  
Source: Own calculations using data from [www.servel.cl](http://www.servel.cl).

This last interpretation suggests that the case of Chile should perhaps be viewed in terms similar to those used for the advanced industrialized democracies analysed by Dalton<sup>36</sup> or, in other words, that political parties lose their centrality as a country's per capita income gradually increases and its citizens become ever more educated and autonomous and, therefore, less loyal to parties or coalitions.<sup>37</sup> As their living standards improve, citizens come to feel that personal effort suffices, particularly in the case of those who are most educated and have the most academic qualifications. The problem is that the characteristics suggested by Dalton to explain disaffection in these societies do not apply so readily to Chile. Why? Because, in Chile, a highly unequal country,<sup>38</sup> there are not significant differences between young people and adults as regards party identification while in the groups with a high level of cultural capital it is precisely the most educated who show the highest degree of identification. For Dalton and all the authors who advocate the hypothesis of voter dealignment, the relationship is exactly the opposite. It is those citizens with the greatest cognitive abilities who distance themselves most from politics. In the terms of Dalton,<sup>39</sup> the process of "cognitive mobilization" implies "the ability to acquire political information and the ability to process political information" or, in other words, competencies that vary with educational level. These citizens do not see the parties as central agents of representation and, therefore, show ever greater independence from these institutions.

Our interpretation, backed both by data from opinion polls and recent historical events, is that, although Chile is seen as having one of the region's most institutionalized party systems,<sup>40</sup> there has for some time been a generalized crisis of trust in institutions<sup>41</sup> which has led part of the country's citizens to protest through direct action. In 2011 and 2012, there were important student mobilizations and social demands that were not channelled through the political parties, under a right-wing government and a president with low approval ratings. During these years, LAPOP studies found that identification with political parties dropped to below

15%. However, according to surveys carried out by the Universidad Diego Portales, citizens' economic perceptions were particularly positive in this period. In 2012, it found that only 17% considered their economic situation to be bad and only 12.8% that it would be "worse" in the following year. Similarly, in the case of the country's economic situation, less than 18% were pessimistic. In the light of this data, it is, therefore, difficult to accept the thesis of Mayol about a supposed "collapse" of Chile's development model.<sup>42</sup> More complexly, there is not a crisis of institutions or of the economic model in Chile but rather a historical situation of dispute about the justice of the development model in the context of a crisis of representation. This does not mean that the crisis of representation is a consequence only of unsatisfied demands or of the effect produced by new social movements.<sup>43</sup> There are other reasons for this crisis, many of them institutional, including the existence of a binominal system for electing members of the Lower House and the Senate which results in the creation of two large coalitions, discouraging the representation of small parties that lack the capacity to form alliances; a reinforced presidentialism; a Congress that is weak compared to the executive, etc. It is all these reasons which explain why citizens have effectively distanced themselves from the parties and are critical of the country's political institutions. The singularity of the crisis of representation in Chile is that it does not have its origin in the variables typically studied at the comparative level and which are the result of economic crises,<sup>44</sup> a policy switch,<sup>45</sup> problems in the structure of the state<sup>46</sup> or the rule of law,<sup>47</sup> and, even, deficiencies in the adaptation of traditional parties to the neoliberal model.<sup>48</sup>

Politically speaking, this crisis of representation is characterized first by a systematic drop in identification with parties which has, however, not been accompanied by a significant increase in voting for other political forces. In the last municipal election in 2012, for example, over 82% of votes for councillors went to the two dominant coalitions, a figure similar to the 2004 and 2008 municipal elections, even though, as discussed above, turnout was significantly lower. It is important to note that this electoral predominance is seen not only in legislative elections where few candidates are returned ( $N = 2$ ) but also under the proportional system of municipal elections where each municipality elects between six and ten councillors.

#### **4.2. *The perverse effects of the reform***

With voluntary voting, the electoral register grew sharply from 8.3 million to 13.4 million people in 2012 since automatic registration meant the incorporation of over five million new voters. In the 2009 election, young people aged between 18 and 29 accounted for only 7% of the register but in 2012 this figure almost quadrupled to over 26%. This occurred because lack of interest in registering had meant that they represented an important part of those not on the register.

The significant increase in the electoral register raised the question not only of turnout but also its composition or, in other words, if more rich than poor people

would vote, thereby reproducing the effects of the previous system of voluntary registration and compulsory voting.<sup>49</sup> As discussed above, the competitiveness of an election tends to favour turnout, given the greater level of uncertainty, while, in elections where there is a clear favourite, turnout may be lower. In the latter case, citizens have less incentive to vote either for the favourite (a sure winner) or the runner-up (a sure loser). This is even more apparent under a system of voluntary voting where abstention carries no sanction.

The size of the municipality also needs to be taken into account. As occurred in the primary election through which the Concertación center-left coalition nominated candidates for mayor, turnout was significantly higher in small municipalities than in large ones.<sup>50</sup> This reflects the fact that in small municipalities candidates are better able to mobilize voters. This is particularly evident when incumbents are standing and feel threatened by powerful challengers. It is assumed, on the other hand, that strong incumbents who feel confident of victory have few incentives for mobilizing voters and turnout may, therefore, be lower.

In order to evaluate these hypotheses, we developed a linear regression model, segmenting the country's 345 municipalities into those with over 70,000 voters and those with less than 70,000, with this dividing line defined in accordance with the Constitutional Organic Municipalities Law (Article 72). Under this law, municipalities with less than 70,000 voters elect six councillors, those with between 70,000 and 150,000 elect eight and those with over 150,000 elect ten. In our model, the group of large municipalities comprises those which elect eight or ten councillors.

## 5. Method and data

In order to answer the research question, we compiled a database of the country's 345 municipalities for all of which there is electoral and socio-economic information or, in other words, data on variables that include election competitiveness, turnout, the number of voters per municipality, the poverty rate, and average years of education. The objective, as indicated above, is to measure the effect of competition and poverty on turnout after controlling for other relevant variables. [Table 1](#) shows each variable and its respective definition. The dependent variable is turnout in the 2012 municipal election. The first independent variable is turnout in 2008 which serves to control for turnout in the previous municipal election. The second independent variable, in order to control for the size of municipalities, is the number of voters, while the third variable distinguishes between those municipalities where an incumbent was standing and those where the race was open (that is, without incumbents). The fourth variable is the municipality's poverty rate in 2011 and the fifth is the competitiveness of the election, measured as the percentage difference between the vote of the winner and the runner-up. This latter indicator has some weaknesses<sup>51</sup> since it is possible that an election was forecast to be competitive but, in the event, the winner obtained a significant lead. In this sense, it would be ideal to have information for all the municipalities, based on pre-election polls, in order to evaluate how competitive the election was *perceived* to be.

Table 1. Variables and their definition.

Variable	Definition
<i>Dependent variable</i>	
Turnout 2012 election	Number of voters over total number of persons eligible to vote in 2012 (with voluntary voting)
<i>Independent variables</i>	
Turnout 2008 election	Number of voters over total number of persons eligible to vote in 2012 (with compulsory voting)
Electoral register 2012	Number of persons eligible to vote in 2012. This includes all those aged 18 years and over
Incumbency	This variable takes the value “1” when an incumbent mayor is competing and “0” when there is no incumbent candidate
Poverty rate 2011	Number of poor people over total number of inhabitants of municipality. This figure was taken from the National Municipal Information System ( <a href="http://www.sinim.cl">www.sinim.cl</a> ) based on data from the 2009 CASEN Survey
Competitiveness of the election	Percentage difference between the winning candidate for mayor and the runner-up
Poverty rate 2011*competitiveness	This is an interaction term. It is assumed that in rich municipalities with a low degree of competition turnout is higher than in poor municipalities with a low degree of competition, in line with the hypothesis of class bias
Average education	Average years of education of the inhabitants of each municipality

Source: Own calculations.

Unfortunately, however, this information does not exist and we had, therefore, to take the percentage difference between the winner and the runner-up as the best proxy. As the fifth variable, we include a term for interaction between poverty and the election’s competitiveness. Our hypothesis is that in the group of large municipalities turnout will be found to be higher in rich than poor municipalities when controlling for the level of competition or, in other words, that, for an identical level of competition, turnout is systematically higher in rich municipalities than in poor ones. Finally, we include average years of education per municipality, which is a control variable.

We use two indicators to examine class bias: the percentage of poor people and municipalities’ average income. We expect both to function similarly, thereby supporting the hypothesis of class bias or economic adversity. Indeed, when we use opinion poll data, both people’s income and educational level have the expected effect or, in other words, both show a positive correlation with their probability of turning out to vote. This is, at least, the case for the opinion polls carried out by the Universidad Diego Portales (UDP). Therefore, despite discussion about class bias (measured using income) as against economic adversity (measured using poverty and education), both function similarly in Chile for data at the

level of municipalities and individuals. In the case of the surveys, the dependent variable used for 2008 was those registered to vote and for 2012 those who report having voted.<sup>52</sup>

As indicated above, our theoretical discussion involves both poverty rates and levels of electoral competition. We suspect there is a combined effect of poverty (a structural condition) and electoral competition (a contingent condition) on turnout.<sup>53</sup> It does not suffice to include these variables independently in the statistical models and we therefore build an interaction term. Figure 4 describes the relation between the two variables. We divide the sample into two groups based on the poverty rate. On the one hand, there are those municipalities in which the poverty rate is a standard deviation above the mean – or, in other words, over 21.9% – and, on the other, those where it is less than 21.9%. As shown in Figure 4, the correlation between competition and turnout is very different for the two groups. In the group of poorest municipalities, it reaches  $-0.37$  but, in the group of “less poor” municipalities, only  $-0.06$ . In other words, “less poor” municipalities are significantly less sensitive to the effect of competition on turnout than the poorest municipalities. Precisely for this reason, we take the view that they should be treated differently.

In order to prove our hypothesis, we use both linear regression models with the ordinary least squares (OLS) method and linear regression models with the weighted least squares (WLS) method. Chile’s municipalities have electorates of very different sizes (from 370 to over 300,000 voters) and a model that does not




Figure 4. Relation between competition and turnout by poverty rate per municipality, 2012 municipal elections.

Source: Own calculations using data from [www.serve.cl](http://www.serve.cl), [www.ine.cl](http://www.ine.cl) and [www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl).

take this into account could, by treating large and small municipalities as if they were the same, result in serious distortions. In the case of data, we use the poverty rate which is available for all the country's municipalities. Very different are the range of variation of average income and average education. Moreover, municipalities' poverty rates, which range from 0.2% to 44.6%, permit somewhat more robust inferences than average education, which ranges from 4.95 to 15.91 years. The latter is, however, included as a control variable in some models.

Table 2 shows the results of a linear regression model with the OLS method. The dependent variable is turnout in the 2012 municipal elections. This model is not weighted by the size of each municipality's electorate but does include it as an independent variable.

Table 3 shows the results of the same exercise but with a WLS model where the weighting variable is the size of the municipality's electorate. The interpretation does not differ significantly and, indeed, the variable for interaction between poverty and competition maintains its statistical significance and the expected sign across the three models. This table also includes a model with the variable

Table 2. Linear regression model (OLS). The dependent variable is turnout in the 2012 municipal elections.

Variable	MODEL 1 General model	MODEL 2 Municipality with less than 70,000 voters <sup>a</sup>	MODEL 3 Municipality with 70,000 and more voters
Turnout 2008	-0.00434 (0.0115)	-0.0277** (0.0120)	0.00339 (0.0411)
Electoral register 2012	-0.000107*** (7.75e-06)	-0.000307*** (3.85e-05)	-2.87e-05*** (8.18e-06)
Incumbency (1 = Incumbent; 0 = Non-incumbent)	1.082 (1.130)	1.086 (1.303)	2.041* (1.135)
Poverty rate 2011	0.117 (0.0781)	0.148* (0.0860)	0.242** (0.117)
Competitiveness of election	-0.0253 (0.0611)	0.0175 (0.0766)	0.0717 (0.0567)
Poverty rate*competitiveness	-0.00398 (0.00338)	-0.00394 (0.00396)	-0.0104*** (0.00380)
Constant	53.05*** (1.972)	57.21*** (2.204)	37.50*** (4.156)
Observations	344	277	67
R <sup>2</sup>	0.424	0.211	0.363

Note: <sup>a</sup>Excludes Santo Domingo where there was only one candidate. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . \*\* $p < 0.05$ . \* $p < 0.1$ .

Source: Own calculations using data from [www.servel.cl](http://www.servel.cl), [www.ine.cl](http://www.ine.cl) and [www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl).

Table 3. Weighted least squares (WLS) model. The dependent variable is turnout in the 2012 municipal elections.

Variables	MODEL 1 General model (with poverty)	MODEL 2 General model (with income)	MODEL 3 Municipality with less than 70,000 voters	MODEL 4 Municipality with 70,000 and more voters
Turnout 2008	0.168*** (0.0240)	0.186*** (0.0264)	0.0897*** (0.0211)	0.0690* (0.0399)
Incumbency (1 = Incumbent; 0 = Non-incumbent)	2.524** (0.980)	2.887*** (1.011)	-0.434 (1.272)	1.891 (1.240)
Poverty rate (2011)	0.486*** (0.0854)		0.106 (0.0908)	0.267** (0.129)
Competitiveness of election	0.0866 (0.0533)	-0.171*** (0.0426)	0.0690 (0.0813)	0.0976 (0.0643)
Poverty rate*competitiveness	-0.00965*** (0.00336)		-0.00699* (0.00421)	-0.00964** (0.00450)
Income (2011)		-7.11e-06*** (1.41e-06)		
Income* competitiveness		1.26e-07*** (3.07e-08)		
Constant	22.33*** (2.050)	34.34*** (2.135)	43.43*** (2.522)	27.95*** (3.136)
Observations	344	323	277	67
R <sup>2</sup>	0.268	0.262	0.081	0.189

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . \*\* $p < 0.05$ . \* $p < 0.1$ .

Source: Own calculations using data from [www.serve.cl](http://www.serve.cl), [www.ine.cl](http://www.ine.cl) and [www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl).

“income” and the variable for interaction between “income” and competition. The results point in the same direction as the original model with “poverty”. Finally, we show the results of the models that include average education as a statistical control (see Table 4). Again, the variable for interaction between poverty and competition is significant for all municipalities and in the groups of small and large municipalities. In other words, all the models point in the same direction in that if the variables are considered in isolation, poor municipalities generally have a higher turnout than rich municipalities. This is also the case for average education, with a higher average level of education implying a lower turnout. However, on analysing the interaction of these variables with the level of competition, the interpretation changes. Particularly for the largest municipalities, turnout is higher in richer municipalities with a higher level of competition while the opposite is the case for poor municipalities with lower levels of competition.

The results of the model show the expected coefficients. For both groups of municipalities, their size as measured by the number of voters has a negative effect on turnout or, in other words, the larger the municipality’s size, the lower the turnout, which is consistent with the literature. Poverty, on the other hand,

Table 4. Weighted least squares (WLS) model including “average education”. The dependent variable is turnout in the 2012 municipal elections.

Variable	MODEL 1 General model	MODEL 2 Municipality with less than 70,000 voters	MODEL 3 Municipality with 70,000 and more voters
Turnout 2008	0.159*** (0.0241)	0.0801*** (0.0257)	0.0667 (0.0403)
Incumbency (1 = Incumbent; 0 = Non-incumbent)	2.400*** (0.912)	-1.036 (1.251)	1.814 (1.252)
Poverty rate 2011	0.189** (0.0877)	0.0369 (0.0906)	0.309** (0.147)
Competitiveness of election	0.152*** (0.0499)	0.111 (0.0801)	0.0909 (0.0655)
Poverty rate*competitiveness	-0.0128*** (0.00314)	-0.00847** (0.00413)	-0.00921** (0.00457)
Average education	-2.519*** (0.307)	-2.395*** (0.512)	0.326 (0.528)
Constant	53.65*** (4.437)	67.56*** (6.264)	23.93*** (7.237)
Observations	323	256	67
R <sup>2</sup>	0.409	0.186	0.194

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . \*\* $p < 0.05$ . \* $p < 0.1$ .

Source: Own calculations using data from [www.servel.cl](http://www.servel.cl), [www.ine.cl](http://www.ine.cl) and [www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl).




Figure 5. Expected turnout by poverty rate and election competitiveness.  
Source: Own calculations using data from [www.serve.cl](http://www.serve.cl), [www.ine.cl](http://www.ine.cl) and [www.elecciones.gov.cl](http://www.elecciones.gov.cl).

has differentiated effects, with the model indicating that, for large municipalities, turnout was higher in poor municipalities than rich municipalities whilst, in small municipalities, poverty does not have a significant effect. The same also occurs for both groups in the case of the election's competitiveness and the participation of an incumbent. None of these variables have significant effects on turnout. The results so far, therefore, would support the thesis that turnout is higher in poor than rich municipalities. The term for interaction between poverty and the election's competitiveness, however, clarifies this doubt. For the group of large municipalities, it shows that turnout decreases in poor as compared to rich municipalities in accordance with changes in the election's competitiveness.

In order to illustrate this point more clearly, we carried out a statistical simulation using the Clarify software for Stata, calculating turnout while simultaneously moving the values for poverty and competitiveness (Figure 5). We simulated municipalities with a competitive election, taking differences between winner and runner-up of 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, and 30% of the vote. Turnout is very similar in rich and poor municipalities where the level of competition is high (with a 1% difference between the winner and the runner-up). Larger differences in turnout are found with a 5% level of competitiveness, always in favour of rich municipalities, and these become more significant as the difference between the vote of the winner and the runner-up widens or, in other words, as the election's competitiveness decreases.

The interpretations suggested by the model are as follows:

- (1) Where the election is very competitive (with a difference of 1% to 5% between winner and runner-up), turnout is similar in rich and poor municipalities.

- (2) Where the election is less competitive (with a difference of 10% or more between winner and runner-up), rich municipalities have a significantly higher turnout than poor ones.
- (3) Differences in turnout in response to variations in the election's competitiveness are significantly larger in poor municipalities than rich municipalities. In other words, turnout decreases more markedly in poor municipalities when an election is less competitive as compared to an identical situation in a rich municipality.

Prior to the reform, rich municipalities systematically voted more than poor municipalities, particularly in the Santiago Metropolitan Region.<sup>54</sup> As voting was compulsory, people turned out regardless of the competitiveness of the election in their municipality. With voluntary voting, however, the level of competition acquired more importance. When the election is competitive, turnout is similar in rich and poor municipalities while when it is less competitive rich municipalities vote more than poor ones. This may reflect the fact that the base turnout in rich municipalities, with their more educated voters, was always systematically higher than in poor municipalities.<sup>55</sup> Voters in rich municipalities can, in other words, be said to be less responsive to variations in the level of competition.

As indicated in the introduction, it is very probable that poor and rich municipalities react similarly to high levels of competition, due to the existence of clientelist practices that become even more decisive in an election where voting is voluntary. When it is compulsory, the cost of going to vote falls on the voter, whereas when it is voluntary, it falls on the parties. In a situation with a high level of disaffection but also a high degree of competition between the candidates, it is possible that rich segments are mobilized by programmatic interests, while in poor sectors this reflects the exchange of votes for favours from the parties or candidates.

## 6. Implications and conclusions

There is considerable debate about the effects of voluntary voting on the class bias of election turnout. This bias may be reduced when there are strong left-wing parties and unions because these agents produce greater electoral mobilization among poor segments of the population and, therefore, a more heterogeneous turnout. Similarly, this bias is less when voting is relatively easy in the context of a low level of party fragmentation.

In Chile, all the characteristics associated with strong class bias are present. However, the evidence of the results of the 2012 municipal election (the first with voluntary voting) is contradictory. The absence of a linear relationship between a municipality's poverty rate and its turnout is at odds with the idea that class bias is reproduced on a large scale when left-wing parties and unions are weak. We argue that the variable which explains this result is the competitiveness of an election. When this is greater, turnout is higher and class bias is smaller.

Our results, therefore, support three conclusions. First, in municipalities where the election is very competitive, turnout is similar in both rich and poor municipalities. Second, in municipal municipalities where the election is not very competitive, turnout is significantly higher in rich than in poor municipalities and, finally, turnout drops more in poor municipalities with a not very competitive election than in rich municipalities where this is also the case.

In other words, socio-economic level alone does not explain variations in turnout. In order to analyse class bias under a system of voluntary voting, it is necessary to take into account other related variables, principally an election's competitiveness and the size of each constituency. Theoretically, then, our work contributes to the combined analysis of structural and circumstantial variables as a means of understanding variations in turnout. It is certainly limited by the fact that it focuses on just one country and a local election. However, this limitation can also be an advantage. Since we study 345 units with different poverty rates and levels of election competitiveness, the sample is significantly larger than it would be for analysis at the level of constituencies for the election of Lower House representatives and senators. In Chile, municipalities are the smallest units of analysis for which electoral information (competition) and socio-economic information (poverty) are available. This means that, methodologically, the conclusions are more robust than they would be for a countrywide analysis of a presidential election. Certainly, we must await subsequent elections to see if our argument holds, but our theoretical, methodological, and statistical proposal already provides relevant information for understanding turnout under a voluntary voting regime.

### Funding

This article received funding from FONDECYT Project 1130054 and from the project "A Crisis of Legitimacy: Challenges to the Political Order in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay", financed by Canada's IDRC. Many thanks to Ruth Bradley for her wonderful skills in translation. We also appreciate the support of a CONICYT grant from the Chilean Ministry of Education (CONICYT/FONDAP/15130009).

### Notes

1. Corvalán and Cox, "Class-biased Electoral Participation."
2. Jackman, "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout"; Jackman, "Compulsory Voting"; Lijphart, "Unequal Participation"; Rallings, Thrasher, and Borisjuk, "Seasonal Factors, Voter Fatigue and the Costs of Voting"; Blais, "¿Qué afecta la participación electoral?"
3. Blais and Dobrzynska, "Turnout in Electoral Democracies"; Fornos, Power, and Garand, "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000"; Geys, "Explaining Voter Turnout"; Endersby and Kriekhaus, "Turnout around the Globe."
4. Mackerras and McAllister, "Compulsory Voting, Party Stability and Electoral Advantage in Australia."

5. Ibid., 229.
6. Lijphart, "Unequal Participation"; Gallego, "Understanding Unequal Turnout."
7. Lijphart, "Unequal Participation."
8. Mahler, "Electoral Turnout and Income Redistribution by the State." As will be shown below, these phenomena of voters' unequal competencies have been the cause of important normative debate in the political sciences which has sometimes ended in caricature, producing a biased explanation. This is the case of Verba, "Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn out to be a Nightmare?," 669, who argues that, "the educated are better social scientists and more democratic moral reasoners. They are not only more active; they are better citizens."
9. Martikainen, Martikainen, and Wass, "The Effect of Socioeconomic Factors on Voter Turnout in Finland."
10. Corvalán and Cox, "Class-biased Electoral Participation."
11. Indridason, "Competition & Turnout"; Simonovits, "Competition and Turnout Revisited."
12. Simonovits, "Competition and Turnout Revisited."
13. Johnston, Matthews, and Bittner, "Turnout and the Party System in Canada, 1988–2004."
14. Huneus, *Chile. Un país dividido*.
15. Morales, "Identificación partidaria en América Latina."
16. Corvalán and Cox, "Class-biased Electoral Participation."
17. Kitschelt et al., *Latin American Party System*.
18. Morales and Bugueño, "La UDI como Expresión de la Nueva Derecha en Chile"; Calvo and Murillo, "When Parties Meet Voters"; Valenzuela, *Political Brokers in Chile*.
19. Corvalán and Cox, "Class-biased Electoral Participation"; Contreras and Navia, "Diferencias generacionales en la participación electoral en Chile, 1988–2010."
20. Payne et al., *La política importa. Democracia y desarrollo en América Latina*.
21. "Abstention" in this election includes not only those who opted not to vote but also people who were in prison without having been sentenced (some 15,000). In addition, the electoral register included some 500,000 voters in the 80–139 age range who were no longer alive and, most importantly, the approximately one million Chileans who are resident abroad. (Chile does not have early or postal voting or permit voting at embassies and consulates.)
22. Corvalán and Cox, "Class-biased Electoral Participation."
23. Lewis, "The 'Gender Gap' in Chile," shows that Chilean women cast less blank and spoiled votes than men and abstain less.
24. Indridason, "Competition & Turnout"; Simonovits, "Competition and Turnout Revisited."
25. In 2010, the survey of the Universidad Diego Portales (UDP) found that 70.9% of Chileans supported voluntary voting while only 46.7% of members of the Lower House were in favour of this reform (66.7% of those on the right supported voluntary voting as compared to just 25.9% on the center-left); see the study Instituto de Investigación en Ciencias Sociales, *Brechas de representación*, 15.
26. There is, indeed, an abundance of literature showing how turnout varies with population size (for example, Geys, "Explaining Voter Turnout").
27. Corvalán, Cox, and Zahler, "Voto voluntario: . . . ¡Y votaron los más ricos!"; Observatorio Político-Electoral UDP, "Los ricos también votan."
28. Payne et al., *La política importa. Democracia y desarrollo en América Latina*.
29. In electoral terms, Chile's transition to democracy began with the plebiscite of October 1988 in which General Pinochet was defeated. The first general elections (presidential and legislative) took place in December 1989 and in March 1990 President Patricio

- Aylwin replaced General Pinochet. The literature on election turnout in Chile is extensive (Navia, “Participación electoral en Chile 1988–2001”; Carlin, “The Decline of Citizen Participation in Electoral Politics in Post-authoritarian Chile”; Contreras and Navia, “Diferencias generacionales en la participación electoral en Chile, 1988–2010”; Corvalán and Cox, *When Generational Replacement is Class Biased*; and Corvalán and Cox, “Class-biased Electoral Participation”; Parker, *Los jóvenes chilenos*; and Parker, “Abstencionismo, juventud y política en Chile actual”; Toro, “La inscripción electoral de los jóvenes en Chile”; and Toro, “De lo épico a lo cotidiano”; Saldaña, “Crisis en la participación electoral y debate sobre la obligatoriedad del voto en Chile”). Research has focused on variations in spoiled and blank votes (Carlin, “The Decline of Citizen Participation in Electoral Politics in Post-authoritarian Chile”), abstention (Cantillana, “Inscritos que no votan”), and the decline in turnout in poorer sectors of the population (Morales, “Precauciones frente al voto voluntario”).
30. See studies by the Instituto Nacional de la Juventud (INJUV, “Participación política juvenil”; INJUV, “Sistema electoral y participación juvenil”; and INJUV, “Revista Observatorio de Juventud”) as well as Parker (Parker, *Los jóvenes chilenos*; and Parker, “Abstencionismo, juventud y política en Chile actual”), Parker and Salvat, *Formación cívico-política de la juventud, desafío de la democracia*; Lehmann, “La voz de los que no votaron”; Madrid, “¿Políticos de ayer, apáticos de hoy?”; Toro (Toro, “La inscripción electoral de los jóvenes en Chile”; and Toro, “De lo épico a lo cotidiano”), and Corvalán and Cox (*When Generational Replacement is Class Biased*).
  31. Corvalán and Cox, “Class-biased Electoral Participation.”
  32. There is extensive literature on this subject. See Fuentes and Villar, *Voto ciudadano*; Fontaine et al., *Modernización del régimen electoral chileno*; Navia, “Participación electoral en Chile 1988–2001”; Huneus, *Chile. Un país dividido*; Morales, “Precauciones frente al voto voluntario”; Contreras et al., “Nuevo régimen electoral en Chile”; Contreras and Navia, “Diferencias generacionales en la participación electoral en Chile, 1988–2010”; and Del Pozo and Navia, “Los efectos de la voluntariedad del voto y de la inscripción automática en Chile.”
  33. For example, Jakee and Sun, “Is Compulsory Voting more Democratic?,” 62, disagree with compulsory voting and defend voluntary voting, arguing that “when people vote voluntarily, they do so because they intrinsically value the act – whatever the reason.” By contrast, according to these authors, compulsory voting increases the proportion of random votes. This is diametrically opposed to the position of Engelan, “Why Compulsory Voting can Enhance Democracy?,” who establishes a relation between voluntary voting and income inequality: “as turnout declines, less privileged citizens tend to abstain more than others” and will, as a result, have “less representatives” concerned for their interests and “will, therefore, exercise less influence on policy decisions” (Engelan, “Why Compulsory Voting can Enhance Democracy?,” 25).
  34. Law 20.337 modified Articles 15 and 18 of the constitution, establishing automatic registration and eliminating sanctions for failure to vote. At the beginning of 2012, the Constitutional Organic Laws on Chile’s electoral system were also modified, definitively establishing automatic registration and voluntary voting.
  35. The 2012 municipal election took place in a contradictory context of economic prosperity (with annual growth rates of around 5.5% and full employment) and a low approval rating for the president (around 30%), with a very low level of identification with political parties (29.7% according to the July–August 2012 survey by the Centro de Estudios Públicos, CEP) as well as a significant drop in trust in institutions, a trend that had been apparent since 2011 in the surveys of the Universidad Diego Portales (UDP).

36. Dalton, "Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies"; Dalton, "Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior."
37. Dalton, "Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior"; Dalton, Farrell, and McAllister, *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage*.
38. According to measurement of income distribution (Gini coefficient) by the World Bank, Chile is the most unequal country in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Among the 160 countries included in the index (where the top place goes to the most equal country), it ranks 141st.
39. Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 21.
40. Mainwaring and Scully, "La institucionalización de los Sistemas de Partidos en América Latina"; Payne et al., *La política importa*.
41. The 1998 UNDP report highlighted for the first time the decline in both interpersonal trust and trust in political institutions.
42. Mayol, *El derrumbe del modelo*.
43. It is not just citizens of any type who participate in these new social movements. In Chile, they are middle-class students, often from families in which they are the first generation to attend university. In other words, as stated by Dalton, *Citizen Politics*, 74, "protest isn't primarily an outlet for the alienated and deprived; often, it is just the opposite."
44. Remmer, "Economic Crisis and Elections in Latin America, 1982–1990."
45. Stokes, *Mandates and Democracy*.
46. Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro, *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes*.
47. O'Donnell, *Contrapuntos*.
48. Levitsky, *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America*.
49. Morales, "Precauciones frente al voto voluntario"; Morales, "Identificación partidaria en América Latina."
50. Morales, "The Concertación's Defeat in the 2009/2010 Presidential Elections in Chile."
51. Blais, "¿Qué afecta la participación electoral?," 20, recalls that "the standard indicator consists in the difference between the most voted and the second party" whilst also recognizing that "it is not clear if what is important is the difference in votes or in seats" (or, we would say, in percentage).
52. Contreras and Morales, "Precisiones sobre el sesgo de clase con voto voluntario."
53. Ecological inference analysis indicates that large municipalities systematically voted less than small ones, with turnouts of 36.2% and 50.2%, respectively. In the case of poverty, municipalities with a poverty rate with a higher than average standard deviation had a turnout of over 53% while rich municipalities had a turnout of 48.7%. The "eco" R software package was used for this analysis (see Imai, Lu, and Strauss, "Eco: R Package for Ecological Inference in 2X2 Tables"). As seen above and particularly in Figure 6, the relationship between poverty and turnout is determined largely by an election's competitiveness.
54. Contreras and Morales, "Precisiones sobre el sesgo de clase con voto voluntario."
55. Navia, "Participación electoral en Chile 1988–2001"; Contreras and Navia, "Diferencias generacionales en la participación electoral en Chile, 1988–2010"; Corvalán and Cox, *When Generational Replacement is Class Biased*.

### Notes on contributors

Gonzalo Contreras, Observatorio Político Electoral, Universidad Diego Portales, Chile.

Alfredo Joignant, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne. Full professor in political science, Universidad Diego Portales. Principal investigator, Centro de Estudios de Conflicto y

Cohesión Social (COES), and associate investigator, Instituto de Investigación en Ciencias Sociales (ICSO), Universidad Diego Portales. Past president, Asociación Chilena de Ciencia Política (1998–2000).

Mauricio Morales, Universidad Católica de Chile. Director, Observatorio Político Electoral, Universidad Diego Portales. Associate professor, Escuela de Ciencia Política, Universidad Diego Portales, and associate investigator, Instituto de Investigación en Ciencias Sociales (ICSO), Universidad Diego Portales.

## Bibliography

- Blais, André. “¿Qué afecta la participación electoral?” *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* 18 (2008): 9–27.
- Blais, André, and Agnieszka Dobrzynska. “Turnout in Electoral Democracies.” *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (1998): 239–61.
- Calvo, Ernesto, and María Victoria Murillo. “When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing Political Linkages Through Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile.” *Comparative Political Studies* 46, no. 7 (2013): 851–82.
- Cantillana, Carlos. “Inscritos que no votan: la abstención electoral en Chile y sus factores explicativos.” In *El genoma electoral chileno. Dibujando el mapa genético de las preferencias políticas en Chile*, edited by Patricio Navia, Mauricio Morales and Renato Briceño, 77–96. Santiago: Ed. Universidad Diego Portales, 2009.
- Carlin, Ryan. “The Decline of Citizen Participation in Electoral Politics in Post-authoritarian Chile.” *Democratization* 13, no. 4 (2006): 632–51.
- Contreras, Gonzalo, Florencia González, Mauricio Morales, and Daniela Oliva. “Nuevo régimen electoral en Chile. Inscripción automática y voto voluntario.” In *Democracia Municipal en Chile, 1992–2010*, edited by Mauricio Morales y Patricio Navia, 65–94. Santiago: Ed. Universidad Diego Portales, 2012.
- Contreras, Gonzalo, and Mauricio Morales. “Precisiones sobre el sesgo de clase con voto voluntario.” Centro de Investigación periodística (CIPER Chile), 22 November 2013. <http://ciperchile.cl/2013/11/22/precisiones-sobre-el-sesgo-de-clase-con-voto-voluntario/>
- Contreras, Gonzalo, and Patricio Navia. “Diferencias generacionales en la participación electoral en Chile, 1988–2010.” *Revista de Ciencia Política* 33, no. 2 (2013): 419–41.
- Corvalán, Alejandro, and Paulo Cox. *When Generational Replacement is Class Biased: Chilean Turnout (1989–2008)*. New York University. Manuscript, 2010.
- Corvalán, Alejandro, and Paulo Cox. “Class-biased Electoral Participation: The Youth Vote in Chile.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 55, no. 3 (2013): 47–68.
- Corvalán, Alejandro, Paulo Cox, and Andrés Zahler. “Voto voluntario: . . . ¡Y votaron los más ricos!” Centro de Investigación periodística (CIPER Chile), 5 November 2012. <http://ciperchile.cl/2012/11/05/voto-voluntario-%E2%80%A6-%C2%A1y-votaron-mas-los-ricos/>
- Dalton, Russell J. “Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies.” In *Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance*, edited by Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Dalton, Russell J. “Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior.” *Comparative Political Studies* 33, nos. 6–7 (2000): 912–40.
- Dalton, Russell J. *Citizen Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. California: CQ Press, 2014.
- Dalton, Russell J., David M. Farrell, and Ian McAllister. *Political Parties and Democratic Linkage. How Parties Organize Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Del Pozo, Belén, and Patricio Navia. “Los efectos de la voluntariedad del voto y de la inscripción automática en Chile.” *Estudios Públicos* 127 (2012): 161–91.

- Endersby, James W., and Jonathan T. Kriekhaus. "Turnout Around the Globe: The Influence of Electoral Institutions on National Voter Participation, 1972–2000." *Electoral Studies* 27, no. 4 (2008): 601–10.
- Engelen, Bart. "Why Compulsory Voting can Enhance Democracy?" *Acta Política* 42 (2007): 23–39.
- Fontaine, Arturo, Cristián Larroulet, José Antonio Viera-Gallo, and Ignacio Walker, eds. *Modernización del régimen electoral chileno*. Santiago: CEP/CIEPLAN/Libertad y Desarrollo/Proyectamérica, Santiago, 2007.
- Fornos, Carolina A., Timothy J. Power, and James C. Garand. "Explaining Voter Turnout in Latin America, 1980 to 2000." *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 8 (2004): 909–40.
- Fuentes, Claudio, and Andrés Villar. *Voto ciudadano. Debate sobre la inscripción electoral*. Santiago: FLACSO-Chile, 2005.
- Gallego, Aina. "Understanding Unequal Turnout: Education and Voting in Comparative Perspective." *Electoral Studies* 29 (2010): 239–48.
- Geys, Benny. "Explaining Voter Turnout: A Review of Aggregate-level Research." *Electoral Studies* 25 (2006): 637–63.
- Huneus, Carlos. *Chile. Un país dividido*. Santiago: Catalonia, 2003.
- Imai, Kosuke, Ying Lu, and Aaron Strauss. "Eco: R Package for Ecological Inference in 2X 2 Tables." *Journal of Statistical Software* 42, no. 5 (2011): 1–23.
- Indridason, Indridi. "Competition & Turnout: The Majority Run-off as a Natural Experiment." *Electoral Studies* 27, no. 4 (2008): 699–710.
- Instituto de Investigación en Ciencias Sociales. *Brechas de representación: Elites parlamentarias y ciudadanía en Chile*. Observatorio Político Electoral/ICSO-UDP. Santiago: Ed. Universidad Diego Portales, 2010.
- Instituto Nacional de la Juventud. "Participación política juvenil: dilemas y tensiones actuales." *Revista Observatorio de Juventud* 4 (2004): 1–42.
- Instituto Nacional de la Juventud. "Sistema electoral y participación juvenil." *Revista Observatorio de Juventud* 19 (2008): 5–71.
- Instituto Nacional de la Juventud. "Revista Observatorio de Juventud." *Revista Observatorio de Juventud* 29 (2011): 5–101.
- Jackman, Robert W. "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies." *The American Political Science Review* 81, no. 2 (1987): 405–24.
- Jackman, Simon. "Compulsory Voting." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001.
- Jakee, Keith, and Guang –Zhen Sun. "Is Compulsory Voting more Democratic?" *Public Choice* 129 (2006): 61–75.
- Johnston, Richard, J. Scott Matthews, and Amanda Bittner. "Turnout and the Party System in Canada, 1988–2004." *Electoral Studies* 26 (2007): 735–45.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, Kirk Hawkins, Juan Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas, and Elizabeth Zechmeister. *Latin American Party System*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Lehmann, Carla. "La voz de los que no votaron." *Puntos de referencia* 197 (1998): 1–7.
- Levitsky, Steven. *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Lewis, Paul H. "The 'Gender Gap' in Chile." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 36 (2004): 719–42.
- Lijphart, Arendt. "Unequal Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma." *The American Political Science Review* 91, no. 1 (1997): 1–14.
- Mackerras, Malcolm, and Ian McAllister. "Compulsory Voting, Party Stability and Electoral Advantage in Australia." *Electoral Studies* 18 (1999): 217–33.
- Madrid, Sebastián. "¿Políticos de ayer, apáticos de hoy? Generaciones, juventud y política en Chile." In *Voto ciudadano. Debate sobre la inscripción electoral*, edited by Claudio Fuentes and Andrés Villar, 45–83. Santiago: FLACSO-Chile, 2005.

- Mahler, Vincent A. "Electoral Turnout and Income Redistribution by the State: A Cross-national Analysis of the Developed Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 47, no. 2 (2008): 161–83.
- Mainwaring, Scott, Ana María Bejarano, and Eduardo Pizarro. *The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy Scully. "La institucionalización de los Sistemas de Partidos en América Latina." *Revista de Ciencia Política* 17, nos. 1–2 (1995): 63–102.
- Martikainen, Pekka, Tuomo Martikainen, and Hanna Wass. "The Effect of Socioeconomic Factors on Voter Turnout in Finland: A Register-based Study of 2.9 million Voters." *European Journal of Political Research* 44, no. 5 (2005): 645–69.
- Mayol, Alberto. *El derrumbe del modelo. La crisis de la economía de mercado en el Chile contemporáneo*. Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2012.
- Morales, Mauricio. "Precauciones frente al voto voluntario." In *Chile 2010. Sexta Encuesta Nacional UDP Percepciones y actitudes sociales*, edited by Instituto Ciencias Sociales UDP, 59–72. Santiago: ICSO UDP, 2011.
- Morales, Mauricio. "The Concertación's Defeat in the 2009/2010 Presidential Elections in Chile." *Latin American Politics and Society* 54, no. 2 (2012): 79–107.
- Morales, Mauricio. "Identificación partidaria en América Latina." *Revista de Estudios Sociales* 17, no. 4 (2012): 583–97.
- Morales, Mauricio. "Identificación partidaria en América Latina. Partidos, Instituciones, historia y votantes." Ph.D thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2014.
- Morales, Mauricio, and Rodrigo Bugueño. "La UDI como Expresión de la Nueva Derecha en Chile." *Estudios Sociales* 107 (2001): 215–48.
- Navia, Patricio. "Participación electoral en Chile 1988–2001." *Revista de Ciencia Política* 24, no. 1 (2004): 81–103.
- Observatorio Político-Electoral UDP. "Los ricos también votan. Participación electoral según nivel socioeconómico de las comunas de la Región Metropolitana." Observatorio político electoral. Manuscript, 2012.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. *Contrapuntos: ensayos escogidos sobre autoritarismo y democratización*. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1997.
- Parker, Cristián. *Los jóvenes chilenos: cambios culturales; perspectivas para el siglo XXI*. Santiago: Unidad de Estudios Prospectivos, MIDEPLAN, IDEA-USACH, 2000.
- Parker, Cristián. "Abstencionismo, juventud y política en Chile actual." *Revista de Estudios Avanzados Inter@ctivos* 2, no. 4 (2003): 1–23.
- Parker, Cristián, and Pablo Salvat. *Formación cívico-política de la juventud, desafío de la democracia*. Santiago: CERC-UAHV/Las producciones del Ornitórrinco, 1992.
- Payne, Mark, Daniel Zovatto, Fernando Carrillo, and Andrés Allamand. *La política importa. Democracia y desarrollo en América Latina*. Washington, DC: IADB and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003.
- Rallings, Collin, Michael Thrasher, and Galina Borisyuk. "Seasonal Factors, Voter Fatigue and the Costs of Voting." *Electoral Studies* 22 (2003): 65–79.
- Remmer, Karen. "Economic Crisis and Elections in Latin America, 1982–1990." *American Political Science Review* 85 (1991): 777–800.
- Saldaña, Jorge. "Crisis en la participación electoral y debate sobre la obligatoriedad del voto en Chile." In *El genoma electoral chileno. Dibujando el mapa genético de las preferencias políticas en Chile*, edited by Patricio Navia, Mauricio Morales and Renato Briceño, 55–75. Santiago: Ed. Universidad Diego Portales, 2009.
- Simonovits, Gábor. "Competition and Turnout Revisited: The Importance of Measuring Expected Closeness Accurately." *Electoral Studies* 31, no. 2 (2012): 364–71.
- Stokes, Susan. *Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

- Toro, Sergio. "La inscripción electoral de los jóvenes en Chile. Factores de incidencia y aproximaciones al debate." In *Modernización del régimen electoral chileno*, edited by Arturo Fontaine, Cristián Larroulet, José Antonio Viera-Gallo, and Ignacio Walker, 101–22. Santiago: CIEPLAN/Libertad y Desarrollo/CEP, 2007.
- Toro, Sergio. "De lo épico a lo cotidiano: Jóvenes y generaciones políticas en Chile." *Revista de ciencia Política* 28, no. 3 (2008): 143–60.
- Valenzuela, Arturo. *Political Brokers in Chile. Local Government in Centralized Polity*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1977.
- Verba, Sidney. "Would the Dream of Political Equality Turn out to be a Nightmare?" *Perspectives on Politics* 1, no. 4 (2003): 663–79.